Case Digest: G.R. No. 174689. October 22, 2007

Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio, petitioner, vs. Republic of the Philippines, respondent.
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Facts: Petitioner was born and registered as male. He admitted that he is a male transsexual, that is, “anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a “female” and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment, breast augmentation and sex reassignment surgery. From then on, petitioner lived as female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from Rommel Jacinto to Mely, and his sex from male to female. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner. Republic of the Philippines thru the OSG filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. CA rendered a decision in favor of the Republic.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to change his name and sex in his birth certificate.

Ruling: Article 376 of the Civil Code provides that no person can change his name or surname without judicial authority which was amended by RA 9048 – Clerical Error Law which does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name. Article 412 of the Civil Code provides that no entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order. The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. Hence, no correction is necessary. Article 413 of the Civil Code provides that all other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws. However, there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error is immutable

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate. The remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts. Hence, petition is denied.

Case Digest: G.R. No. 116773. January 16, 1997

Teresita Sagala-Eslao, petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals and Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye, respondents.

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Facts: Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye and Reynaldo Eslao were married of whom two children were begotten, namely, Leslie and Angelica Eslao. Leslie was entrusted to the care and custody of Maria, while Angelica stayed with the husband’s mother, Teresita. When Reynaldo died, Maria intended to bring Angelica with her to Pampanga but Teresita prevailed upon her to entrust the custody of Angelica to her, she reasoned out that her son just died and to assuage her grief therefor, she needed the company of the child to at least compensate for the loss of her late son.  Maria got married to certain Dr. James Ouye and migrated to San Francisco, California, USA, joining her new husband. Maria then returned to the Philippines to be reunited with her children and bring them to the United States; she then informed Teresita about her desire to take custody of Angelica and explained that her present husband expressed his willingness to adopt Leslie and Angelica and to provide for their support and education. However, Teresita resisted the idea by way of explaining that the child was entrusted to her when she was ten days old and accused Maria of having abandoned Angelica.

Issue: Whether or not the mother have the right to the custody of her daughter.

Ruling: The court reiterated its ruling in Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, that parental authority is a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for the purpose of the children’s physical preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of their intellect and the education of their heart and senses. As regards parental authority, ‘there is no power, but a task; no complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor. Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children’s home or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same.

Thus, in the instant petition, when private respondent entrusted the custody of her minor child to the petitioner, what she gave to the latter was merely temporary custody and it did not constitute abandonment or renunciation of parental authority.  For the right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children’s home or an orphan institution which do not appear in the case at bar.

Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts that the right of parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood, a right supported by law and sound public policy.  The right is an inherent one, which is not created by the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental relationship.

Case Digest: G.R. No. 85044. June 3, 1992

Macario Tamargo, Celso Tamargo, and Aurelia Tamargo, petitioners, vs. Court of Appeals, Hon. Judge Ariston L. Rubio of RTC Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur, Victor Bundoc, and Clara Bundoc, Repsondents.

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Facts: Adelberto Bundoc, 10 years old, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. A civil complaint for damages was filed by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent, and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents against respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living at the time of the tragic incident. In addition to this case for damages, homicide through reckless imprudence was filed against Adelberto Bundoc. Adelberto, however, was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability on the ground that he had acted without discernment.

Prior to the incident, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc which was grunted on after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.

Respondent, spouses Bundoc, reciting the result of the foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the adopting parents, namely the spouses Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed. Petitioners contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living with his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a petition for adoption.

Issue: Whether or not the effects of adoption, insofar as parental authority is concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make the adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against their adopted child, for acts committed by the latter, when actual custody was yet lodged with the biological parents.

Ruling: Parental authority is not properly regarded as having been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle shooting happened. It is not to be considered that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when adopting parents had no actual or physically custody over the adopted child. Retroactive effect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented since they were at the time in the United States and had no physical custody over the child Adelberto would be unfair and unconscionable. Such a result, moreover, would be inconsistent with the philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a little differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort was committed. Thus, herein respondent, spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents, were indispensable parties to the suit for damage.

Case Digest: G.R. No. 160725. Septemer 12, 2008

National Power Corporation, petitioner, vs. Purefoods Corporation, Solid Development Corporation, Jose Ortega, Jr., Silvestre Bautista, Alfredo Cabande, Heirs of Victor Trinidad, and Moldex Realty Incorporated, respondents.

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Facts: Petitioner is a government-owned and controlled corporation created by virtue of RA 6395, empowered to acquire property incident to or necessary, convenient or proper to carry out the purposes for which it was created, enter private property in the lawful performance of its business purposes provided that the owners of such private property shall be indemnified for any damage that may be caused thereby, and exercise the right of eminent domain. To construct and maintain its Northwestern Luzon Project, NAPOCOR had to acquire an easement of right-of-way over  certain parcels of land. NAPOCOR filed a civil action for eminent domain of which respondent herein were the vendors and vendees of the affected parcels of land. NAPOCOR contends that only an easement of right-of-way for the construction of the transmission line project is being claimed, thus, only an easement fee equivalent to 10% of the fair market value of the properties should be paid to the affected property owners. NAPOCOR cites Section 3A, R.A. 6395, as amended and the implementing regulation of R.A. No. 8974 in support of this argument.    

Issue: Whether or not only an easement fee of 10% of the market value of the expropriated properties should be paid to the affected owners affecting just compensation for an easement of right-of-way.

Ruling: While Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 6395, as amended, and the implementing rule of R.A. No. 8974 indeed state that only 10% of the market value of the property is due to the owner of the property subject to an easement of right-of-way, said rule is not binding on the Court. Well-settled is the rule that the determination of “just compensation” in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The court reiterated its ruling in Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay, that any valuation for just compensation laid down in the statutes may serve only as guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not substitute the court’s own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount.  The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court’s findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the “just-ness” of the decreed compensation. Hence, herein petition is denied.

Case Digest: G. R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005

In the matter of the adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. Honorato B. Catindig, petitioner
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Facts: Honorato B. Catindig, filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged that Stephanie's middle name be changed to "Garcia," her mother's surname, and that her surname be changed to "Catindig." the trial court granted the petition for adoption. Petitioner then filed for clarification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her biological mother as her middle name. The trial court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration as there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle name.

Issue: Whether an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father.

Ruling: There is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother's surname. The court finds no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.

Case Digest: G. R. No. 105308. September 25, 1998

Herbert Cang, petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals and Spouses Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Clavano, respondents.
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Facts: Petitioner and Ana Marie Clavano were married and begot three children. Ana Marie upon learning of her husband's illicit liaison file a petition for legal separation with alimony pendente lite which was approved. Petitioner then left for the United States where he sought a divorce from Ana Marie. He was issued a divorce decree and granted sole custody of the children to Ana Marie, reserving rights of visitation at all reasonable times and places to petitioner. Private respondents who were the brother and sister-in-law of Ana Marie filed a petition for adoption of the three minor Cang children. The trial court granted the petition for adoption. Ana Marie was the only parent who gives consent to the adoption of their children. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.

Issue: Whether petitioner has abandoned his children, thereby making his consent to the adoption necessary.

Ruling: The law is clear that either parent may lose parental authority over the child only for a valid reason. No such reason was established in the legal separation case. Deprivation of parental authority is one of the effects of a decree of adoption. But there cannot be a valid decree of adoption in this case precisely because the findings of the lower courts on the issue of abandonment of facts on record. The petition for adoption must be denied as it was filed without the required consent of their father who, by law and under the facts of the case at bar, has not abandoned them.