G.R.
No. 118303. January 31, 1996
SENATOR HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, SENATOR JOSE D. LINA, JR., MR. NICASIO B.
BAUTISTA, MR. JESUS P. GONZAGA, MR. SOLOMON D. MAYLEM, LEONORA C. MEDINA,
CASIANO S. ALIPON, petitioners, vs. HON.
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON. RAFAEL
ALUNAN, in his capacity as Secretary of Local Government, HON. SALVADOR
ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, HON.
JOSE MIRANDA, in his capacity as Municipal Mayor of Santiago and HON. CHARITO
MANUFAY, HON. VICTORINO MIRANDA, JR., HON. ARTEMIO ALVAREZ, HON. DANILO
VERGARA, HON. PETER DE JESUS, HON. NELIA NATIVIDAD, HON. CELSO CALEON and HON.
ABEL MUSNGI, in their capacity as SANGGUNIANG BAYAN MEMBERS, MR. RODRIGO L. SANTOS,
in his capacity as Municipal Treasurer, and ATTY. ALFREDO S. DIRIGE, in his
capacity as Municipal Administrator, respondents.
Facts:
On
April 18, 1993, HB No. 8817, entitled "An Act Converting the Municipality
of Santiago into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of
Santiago," was filed in the House of Representatives with Representative
Antonio Abaya as principal author. The
enrolled bill, submitted to the President on April 12, 1994, was signed by the
Chief Executive on May 5, 1994 as Republic Act No. 7720. When a plebiscite on
the Act was held on July 13, 1994, a great majority of the registered voters of
Santiago voted in favor of the conversion of Santiago into a city.
Issue:
Whether
or not the Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs) are to be included in the
computation of the average annual income of a municipality for purposes of its
conversion into an independent component city.
Ruling:
The
court held that petitioners’ asseverations are untenable because Internal
Revenue Allotments form part of the income of Local Government Units. Section
450 (c) of the Local Government Code provides that "the average annual
income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of
special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income." To reiterate, IRAs
are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is there a basis, too, to classify
the same as a special fund or transfer, since IRAs have a technical definition
and meaning all its own as used in the Local Government Code that unequivocally
makes it distinct from special funds or transfers referred to when the Code
speaks of "funding support from the national government, its
instrumentalities and government-owned-or-controlled corporations".
_____________________________________________________________________________________
G.R. No.
117577. December 1, 1995
ALEJANDRO B.
TY AND MVR PICTURE TUBE, INC., petitioners, vs. THE HON. AURELIO C. TRAMPE, in his
capacity as Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, THE HON.
SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE MUNICIPAL ASSESSOR OF PASIG AND THE MUNICIPAL
TREASURER OF PASIG, respondents.
Facts:
On 06 January 1994, respondent Assessor sent a notice of
assessment respecting certain real properties of petitioners located in Pasig,
Metro Manila. In a letter dated 18 March 1994, petitioners through counsel
"request(ed) the Municipal Assessor to reconsider the subject assessments”
Not satisfied, petitioners on 29 March 1994 filed with the Regional Trial Court
of the National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 163, presided over by
respondent Judge, a Petition for Prohibition with prayer for a restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to declare null and void the new
tax assessments and to enjoin the collection of real estate taxes based on said
assessments. In a Decision dated 14 July 1994, respondent Judge denied the
petition "for lack of merit."
Issue:
Whether Republic Act No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, repealed the provisions
of Presidential Decree No. 921.
Ruling:
In disposing of the above issues against petitioners, the
court a quo ruled that the schedule of market values and the
assessments based thereon prepared solely by respondent
assessor are valid and legal, they having been prepared in accordance with the
provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160). It held also that
said Code had effectively repealed the previous law on the matter, P.D. 921,
which required, in the preparation of said schedule, joint action
by all the city and municipal assessors in the Metropolitan Manila area. R.A.
7160 has a repealing provision (Section 534) and, if the intention of the
legislature was to abrogate P.D. 921, it would have included it in such
repealing clause, as it did in expressly rendering of no force and effect
several other presidential decrees. Hence, any repeal or modification of P.D.
921 can only be possible under par.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
G.R. No. 49065. June 1, 1994
EVELIO B. JAVIER, RIZAL G. PAGTANAC, JOVITO C. PLAMERAS, JR.,
SILVESTRE E. UNTARAN, JR. and ALFONSO V. COMBONG, JR., petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
MAXIMIANO SENTINA, JUANITO BULAC, FRED PALLON, AMADO YANGSON, ANGEL MARTINEZ,
DIONISIO NOMBREHERMOSO, MANUEL RIVERO, JR., FEDERICO RUIZ, JR., MELQUIADES
GALIDO, AGUSTIN ALMOROS, GENEROSO BARSUBIA, FELOMINO CABREJAS, FORTUNATO
CADIAO, FERNANDO CONDES, MARCELINO DE LA CRUZ, PELAGIO JUADA, FRANCISCO
JUBILAN, RODOLFO SIASOL, EPE MACABANTI, ERNESTO GRASPARIL, EUSTAQUIO MENA,
DIONISIO JAVIER, PETRONILO BERGANTINOS, FRANCISCO ABANTO, FELIMON ABLE, CORAZON
HABLADO, JOSE ADUG, SILVESTRE ELLO, ESTEBAN MANINGO, ELEUTERIO PLAMERAS, FELIPE
DE LOS REYES, GONZALO VELASCO, TEODULFO NARANJO, ALFREDO BACAWAG, JOSE CEPE,
ENRIQUE JOSILVA, PEDRO QUANICO, PELAGIO ESPARAR, CRISANTO GELLA, RODULFO
GUMANAO and CRISANTO MEJUGE, respondents, ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, intervenor.
Facts:
On 19 April 1974, Provincial Engineer Maximiano Sentina and
forty (40) officials and employees of the Office of the Provincial Engineer
filed a petition for mandamus and damages against the entire
Provincial Board of Antique anchored on the hypothesis that the abolition of
the Office of the Provincial Engineer was a circumvention of the constitutional
mandate on security of tenure and intended only to weed out provincial
officials and employees who opposed the Provincial Board’s candidacy in the
08th November 1971 elections. Respondents, denying petitioners’ ascriptions,
insisted that the abolition of the Office of the Provincial Engineer was
motivated instead by a provision of Presidential Decree No. 17, which lowered
the internal revenue allotment to the road and bridge fund of the province from
50% to 17.5% thereby leaving an inadequate allotment for materials, salaries
and operating expenses of the Office of the Provincial Engineer. Respondents
averred that the power of the provincial board to create an office carried with
it the power to abolish it; that administrative remedies had not been exhausted
by petitioners; and that mandamus was an improper remedy
inasmuch as the power to appropriate funds for the Office was not ministerial
but within the sound judgment of respondents.
Issue:
Whether or not the provincial
board had the authority under the then existing laws to enact the questioned
resolution, and, in the affirmative, whether or not that authority was
legitimately exercised.
Ruling:
The court rule that the power of the province of Antique to
abolish the office in question did exist at the time. The real debatable issue
focuses on the real reasons behind the questioned action of the provincial
board. An abolition of office is not per se objectionable but
this rule carries a caveat that the act is done in good faith.
In sum, we see a situation where the abolition of the office could have well
been justified except for the convexity of circumstances attendant to the
decision process that clearly appear to have greatly influenced the final
action taken by the board. We are not prepared, however, to conclude a clear
case of bad faith on the part of respondents. Given the peculiar factual
settings heretofore expressed, we would have, under ordinary circumstances,
simply issued an order of reinstatement. The Court cannot, however, close its
eyes to the multifarious and significant events that have since taken place on,
among other things, the national and local government structures, as well as
their offices and incumbents; the law itself, both constitutional and
statutory; as well as the personal and other circumstances of concerned
parties, including no less than petitioners and private respondents themselves.
It is our considered view that in lieu of an order for reinstatement of private
respondents, an award for backwages, equivalent to five (5) years without
qualification or deduction, should be paid to said respondents.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
G.R. No. 112889. April
18, 1995
BIENVENIDO O.
MARQUEZ, JR., petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDUARDO T. RODRIGUEZ, respondents.
Facts:
Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated
candidate for the elective position in the Province of Quezon in the May 11,
1992 elections against Eduardo T. Rodriguez whom at the time he filed his
certificate of candidacy, a criminal charge against him for 10 counts of
insurance fraud or grand theft or personal property was still pending before
the Municipal Court of Los Angeles Judicial District, County of Los Angeles,
State of California, U.S.A. A warrant issued by said court for his arrest, it
is claimed, has yet to be served on private respondent on account of his
alleged "flight" from that country. Before the May 11, 1992
elections, a petition for cancellation of respondent's certificate of
candidacy, on the ground of the candidate's disqualification under Section
40(e) of the Local Government Code, was filed by petitioner with the COMELEC.
On 08 May 1992, the COMELEC dismissed the petition.
Issue:
Whether private respondent who,
at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy, is said to be facing
a criminal charge before a foreign court and evading a warrant
for his arrest comes within the term "fugitive from justice"
contemplated by Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code and, therefore,
disqualified from being a candidate for, and thereby ineligible from holding on
to, an elective local office.
Ruling:
The court rule that the private
respondent reminds that the construction placed upon law by the officials in
charge of its enforcement deserves great and considerable weight (Atlas Consolidated
Mining and Development Corp. vs. CA, 182 SCRA 166, 181). The Court certainly
agrees; however, when there clearly is no obscurity and ambiguity in an
enabling law, it must merely be made to apply as it is so written. An
administrative rule or regulation can neither expand nor constrict the law but
must remain congruent to it. The Court believes and thus holds, albeit with
some personal reservations of the ponente (expressed during
the Court's en banc deliberations), that Article 73 of the
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, to the
extent that it confines the term "fugitive from justice" to refer
only to a person (the fugitive) "who has been convicted by final
judgment." is an inordinate and undue circumscription of the law.
Unfortunately, the COMELEC did
not make any definite finding on whether or not, in fact, private respondent is
a "fugitive from justice" as such term must be interpreted and
applied in the light of the Court's opinion. The omission is understandable
since the COMELEC dismissed outrightly the petition for quo warranto on
the basis instead of Rule 73 of the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the
Oversight Committee. The Court itself, not being a trier of facts, is thus
constrained to remand the case to the COMELEC for a determination of this
unresolved factual matter.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
ALEX L. DAVID, in his own
behalf as Barangay Chairman of Barangay 77, Zone 7, Kalookan City and as
President of the LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY SA PILIPINAS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY, Department of Interior and Local
Government, and THE HONORABLE SECRETARY, Department of Budget and
Management, respondents.
LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY QUEZON
CITY CHAPTER, Represented
by BONIFACIO M. RILLON, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, respondents.
Facts:
G.R.
No. 127116: In his capacity as barangay
chairman of Barangay 77, Zone 7, Kalookan City and as president of the Liga ng
mga Barangay sa Pilipinas, Petitioner Alex L. David filed on
December 2, 1996 a petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, to prohibit the holding of the barangay election scheduled on
the second Monday of May 1997.
G.R.
No. 128039: On February 20, 1997,
Petitioner Liga ng mga Barangay Quezon City Chapter represented by its
president Bonifacio M. Rillon filed a petition, docketed as G.R. No. 128039,
“to seek a judicial review by certiorari to declare as
unconstitutional among others Section 43(c) of R.A. 7160 which reads as follows
(c)The term of office of barangay officials and members of the sangguniang
kabataan shall be for three (3) years, which shall begin after the regular
election of barangay officials on the second Monday of May 1994.
As amicus curiae, former Senator
Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. urges the Court to deny the petitions because (1) the
Local Autonomy Code repealed both RA 6679 and 6653 “not only by implication but
by design as well”; (2) the legislative intent is to shorten the term of
barangay officials to three years; (3) the barangay officials should not have a
term longer than that of their administrative superiors, the city and municipal
mayors; and (4) barangay officials are estopped from contesting the
applicability of the three-year term provided by the Local Government Code as
they were elected under the provisions of said Code.
Issues:
1.
Which law governs the term of
office of barangay officials: RA 7160 or RA 6679?
2.
Is RA 7160 insofar as it
shortened such term to only three years constitutional?
3. Are petitioners estopped from claiming a term other than that provided
under RA 7160?
Ruling:
(1) The court ruled in light of the historical background of the barangay elections, the intent and design of the legislature to limit
the term of barangay officials to only three (3) years as provided under the
Local Government Code emerges as bright as the sunlight. The cardinal
rule in the interpretation of all laws is to ascertain and give effect to the
intent of the law. And three years is the obvious intent.
(2) The court ruled to the question at issue on how long the term of barangay officials is, the answer of the Commission was simple, clear and quick: "As may be determined by law"; more precisely, "(a)s provided for in the Local Autonomy Code." And the Local Autonomy Code, in its Sec. 43-c, limits their term to three years.
(3) Yes. The sum total of these absurdities in
petitioners’ theory is that barangay officials are estopped from
asking for any term other than that which they ran for and were elected to,
under the law governing their very claim to such offices: namely, RA 7160, the
Local Government Code. Petitioners’ belated claim of ignorance as to
what law governed their election to office in 1994 is unacceptable because
under Art. 3 of the Civil Code, “(i)gnorance of the law excuses no one from
compliance therewith.”
It is obvious that these two petitions must
fail. The Constitution and the laws do not support
them. Extant jurisprudence militates against them. Reason
and common sense reject them. Equity and morality abhor
them. They are subtle but nonetheless self-serving propositions to
lengthen governance without a mandate from the governed. In a
democracy, elected leaders can legally and morally justify their reign only by
obtaining the voluntary consent of the electorate. In this case
however, petitioners propose to extend their terms not by seeking the
people’s vote but by faulty legal argumentation. This
Court cannot and will not grant its imprimatur to such untenable
proposition. If they want to continue serving, they must get a new
mandate in the elections scheduled on May 12, 1997.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
G.R. No. 133495. September
3, 1998
BENJAMIN U. BORJA, JR., petitioner vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS and JOSE T. CAPCO, JR., respondents.
Facts:
Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected
vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30,
1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law,
upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. On May 11, 1992, he
ran and was elected mayor for a term of three years which ended on June 30,
1995. On May 8, 1995, he was reelected mayor for another term of
three years ending June 30, 1998. On March 27, 1998, private respondent Capco
filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11,
1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a
candidate for mayor, sought Capco’s disqualification on the theory that
the latter would have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms by
June 30, 1998 and would therefore be ineligible to serve for another term after
that.
Issue:
Whether a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of
mayor by operation of law and serves the remainder of the term is considered to
have served a term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit.
Ruling:
No, because he was not elected to the office of the mayor in the first term but simply found himself thrust unto it by operation of law. neither had he served the full term because he only continued the service, interrupted by the death of the deceased mayor.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
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