Public Corporation


G.R. No. 118303. January 31, 1996

SENATOR HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, SENATOR JOSE D. LINA, JR., MR. NICASIO B. BAUTISTA, MR. JESUS P. GONZAGA, MR. SOLOMON D. MAYLEM, LEONORA C. MEDINA, CASIANO S. ALIPON, petitioners, vs. HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON. RAFAEL ALUNAN, in his capacity as Secretary of Local Government, HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, HON. JOSE MIRANDA, in his capacity as Municipal Mayor of Santiago and HON. CHARITO MANUFAY, HON. VICTORINO MIRANDA, JR., HON. ARTEMIO ALVAREZ, HON. DANILO VERGARA, HON. PETER DE JESUS, HON. NELIA NATIVIDAD, HON. CELSO CALEON and HON. ABEL MUSNGI, in their capacity as SANGGUNIANG BAYAN MEMBERS, MR. RODRIGO L. SANTOS, in his capacity as Municipal Treasurer, and ATTY. ALFREDO S. DIRIGE, in his capacity as Municipal Administrator, respondents.

Facts:

On April 18, 1993, HB No. 8817, entitled "An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago," was filed in the House of Representatives with Representative Antonio Abaya as principal author.  The enrolled bill, submitted to the President on April 12, 1994, was signed by the Chief Executive on May 5, 1994 as Republic Act No. 7720. When a plebiscite on the Act was held on July 13, 1994, a great majority of the registered voters of Santiago voted in favor of the conversion of Santiago into a city.

Issue:

Whether or not the Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs) are to be included in the computation of the average annual income of a municipality for purposes of its conversion into an independent component city.

Ruling:

The court held that petitioners’ asseverations are untenable because Internal Revenue Allotments form part of the income of Local Government Units. Section 450 (c) of the Local Government Code provides that "the average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income." To reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is there a basis, too, to classify the same as a special fund or transfer, since IRAs have a technical definition and meaning all its own as used in the Local Government Code that unequivocally makes it distinct from special funds or transfers referred to when the Code speaks of "funding support from the national government, its instrumentalities and government-owned-or-controlled corporations".
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G.R. No. 117577. December 1, 1995

ALEJANDRO B. TY AND MVR PICTURE TUBE, INC., petitioners, vs. THE HON. AURELIO C. TRAMPE, in his capacity as Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, THE HON. SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE MUNICIPAL ASSESSOR OF PASIG AND THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER OF PASIG, respondents.

 Facts:

On 06 January 1994, respondent Assessor sent a notice of assessment respecting certain real properties of petitioners located in Pasig, Metro Manila. In a letter dated 18 March 1994, petitioners through counsel "request(ed) the Municipal Assessor to reconsider the subject assessments” Not satisfied, petitioners on 29 March 1994 filed with the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 163, presided over by respondent Judge, a Petition for Prohibition with prayer for a restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to declare null and void the new tax assessments and to enjoin the collection of real estate taxes based on said assessments. In a Decision dated 14 July 1994, respondent Judge denied the petition "for lack of merit." 

Issue:

Whether Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, repealed the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 921.

Ruling:

In disposing of the above issues against petitioners, the court a quo ruled that the schedule of market values and the assessments based thereon prepared solely by respondent assessor are valid and legal, they having been prepared in accordance with the provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160). It held also that said Code had effectively repealed the previous law on the matter, P.D. 921, which required, in the preparation of said schedule, joint action by all the city and municipal assessors in the Metropolitan Manila area. R.A. 7160 has a repealing provision (Section 534) and, if the intention of the legislature was to abrogate P.D. 921, it would have included it in such repealing clause, as it did in expressly rendering of no force and effect several other presidential decrees. Hence, any repeal or modification of P.D. 921 can only be possible under par.
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G.R. No. 49065. June 1, 1994

EVELIO B. JAVIER, RIZAL G. PAGTANAC, JOVITO C. PLAMERAS, JR., SILVESTRE E. UNTARAN, JR. and ALFONSO V. COMBONG, JR., petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, MAXIMIANO SENTINA, JUANITO BULAC, FRED PALLON, AMADO YANGSON, ANGEL MARTINEZ, DIONISIO NOMBREHERMOSO, MANUEL RIVERO, JR., FEDERICO RUIZ, JR., MELQUIADES GALIDO, AGUSTIN ALMOROS, GENEROSO BARSUBIA, FELOMINO CABREJAS, FORTUNATO CADIAO, FERNANDO CONDES, MARCELINO DE LA CRUZ, PELAGIO JUADA, FRANCISCO JUBILAN, RODOLFO SIASOL, EPE MACABANTI, ERNESTO GRASPARIL, EUSTAQUIO MENA, DIONISIO JAVIER, PETRONILO BERGANTINOS, FRANCISCO ABANTO, FELIMON ABLE, CORAZON HABLADO, JOSE ADUG, SILVESTRE ELLO, ESTEBAN MANINGO, ELEUTERIO PLAMERAS, FELIPE DE LOS REYES, GONZALO VELASCO, TEODULFO NARANJO, ALFREDO BACAWAG, JOSE CEPE, ENRIQUE JOSILVA, PEDRO QUANICO, PELAGIO ESPARAR, CRISANTO GELLA, RODULFO GUMANAO and CRISANTO MEJUGE, respondents, ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR,  intervenor.

Facts:

On 19 April 1974, Provincial Engineer Maximiano Sentina and forty (40) officials and employees of the Office of the Provincial Engineer filed a petition for mandamus and damages against the entire Provincial Board of Antique anchored on the hypothesis that the abolition of the Office of the Provincial Engineer was a circumvention of the constitutional mandate on security of tenure and intended only to weed out provincial officials and employees who opposed the Provincial Board’s candidacy in the 08th November 1971 elections. Respondents, denying petitioners’ ascriptions, insisted that the abolition of the Office of the Provincial Engineer was motivated instead by a provision of Presidential Decree No. 17, which lowered the internal revenue allotment to the road and bridge fund of the province from 50% to 17.5% thereby leaving an inadequate allotment for materials, salaries and operating expenses of the Office of the Provincial Engineer. Respondents averred that the power of the provincial board to create an office carried with it the power to abolish it; that administrative remedies had not been exhausted by petitioners; and that mandamus was an improper remedy inasmuch as the power to appropriate funds for the Office was not ministerial but within the sound judgment of respondents.

Issue:

Whether or not the provincial board had the authority under the then existing laws to enact the questioned resolution, and, in the affirmative, whether or not that authority was legitimately exercised.

Ruling:

The court rule that the power of the province of Antique to abolish the office in question did exist at the time. The real debatable issue focuses on the real reasons behind the questioned action of the provincial board. An abolition of office is not per se objectionable but this rule carries a caveat that the act is done in good faith. In sum, we see a situation where the abolition of the office could have well been justified except for the convexity of circumstances attendant to the decision process that clearly appear to have greatly influenced the final action taken by the board. We are not prepared, however, to conclude a clear case of bad faith on the part of respondents. Given the peculiar factual settings heretofore expressed, we would have, under ordinary circumstances, simply issued an order of reinstatement. The Court cannot, however, close its eyes to the multifarious and significant events that have since taken place on, among other things, the national and local government structures, as well as their offices and incumbents; the law itself, both constitutional and statutory; as well as the personal and other circumstances of concerned parties, including no less than petitioners and private respondents themselves. It is our considered view that in lieu of an order for reinstatement of private respondents, an award for backwages, equivalent to five (5) years without qualification or deduction, should be paid to said respondents.
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G.R. No. 112889. April 18, 1995

BIENVENIDO O. MARQUEZ, JR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDUARDO T. RODRIGUEZ, respondents.

Facts:

Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate for the elective position in the Province of Quezon in the May 11, 1992 elections against Eduardo T. Rodriguez whom at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal charge against him for 10 counts of insurance fraud or grand theft or personal property was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles Judicial District, County of Los Angeles, State of California, U.S.A. A warrant issued by said court for his arrest, it is claimed, has yet to be served on private respondent on account of his alleged "flight" from that country. Before the May 11, 1992 elections, a petition for cancellation of respondent's certificate of candidacy, on the ground of the candidate's disqualification under Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code, was filed by petitioner with the COMELEC. On 08 May 1992, the COMELEC dismissed the petition. 

Issue:

Whether private respondent who, at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy, is said to be facing a criminal charge before a foreign court and evading a warrant for his arrest comes within the term "fugitive from justice" contemplated by Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code and, therefore, disqualified from being a candidate for, and thereby ineligible from holding on to, an elective local office.

Ruling:
The court rule that the private respondent reminds that the construction placed upon law by the officials in charge of its enforcement deserves great and considerable weight (Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corp. vs. CA, 182 SCRA 166, 181). The Court certainly agrees; however, when there clearly is no obscurity and ambiguity in an enabling law, it must merely be made to apply as it is so written. An administrative rule or regulation can neither expand nor constrict the law but must remain congruent to it. The Court believes and thus holds, albeit with some personal reservations of the ponente (expressed during the Court's en banc deliberations), that Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, to the extent that it confines the term "fugitive from justice" to refer only to a person (the fugitive) "who has been convicted by final judgment." is an inordinate and undue circumscription of the law.

Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not, in fact, private respondent is a "fugitive from justice" as such term must be interpreted and applied in the light of the Court's opinion. The omission is understandable since the COMELEC dismissed outrightly the petition for quo warranto on the basis instead of Rule 73 of the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Oversight Committee. The Court itself, not being a trier of facts, is thus constrained to remand the case to the COMELEC for a determination of this unresolved factual matter.
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G.R. No. 127116.  April 8, 1997

ALEX L. DAVID, in his own behalf as Barangay Chairman of Barangay 77, Zone 7, Kalookan City and as President of the LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY SA PILIPINASpetitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY, Department of Interior and Local Government, and THE HONORABLE SECRETARY, Department of Budget and Management, respondents.

G.R. No. 128039.                April 8, 1997

LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY QUEZON CITY CHAPTER, Represented by BONIFACIO M. RILLON, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, respondents.

Facts:

G.R. No. 127116: In his capacity as barangay chairman of Barangay 77, Zone 7, Kalookan City and as president of the Liga ng mga Barangay sa Pilipinas, Petitioner Alex  L. David filed on December 2, 1996 a  petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to prohibit the holding of the barangay election scheduled on the second Monday of May 1997.

G.R. No. 128039: On February 20, 1997, Petitioner Liga ng mga Barangay Quezon City Chapter represented by its president Bonifacio M. Rillon filed a petition, docketed as G.R. No. 128039, “to seek a judicial review by certiorari to declare as unconstitutional among others Section 43(c) of R.A. 7160 which reads as follows (c)The term of office of barangay officials and members of the sangguniang kabataan shall be for three (3) years, which shall begin after the regular election of barangay officials on the second Monday of May 1994.

As amicus curiae, former Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. urges the Court to deny the petitions because (1) the Local Autonomy Code repealed both RA 6679 and 6653 “not only by implication but by design as well”; (2) the legislative intent is to shorten the term of barangay officials to three years; (3) the barangay officials should not have a term longer than that of their administrative superiors, the city and municipal mayors; and (4) barangay officials are estopped from contesting the applicability of the three-year term provided by the Local Government Code as they were elected under the provisions of said Code.

Issues:

1.       Which law governs the term of office of barangay officials:  RA 7160 or RA 6679?
2.       Is RA 7160 insofar as it shortened such term to only three years constitutional?

3.       Are petitioners estopped from claiming a term other than that provided under RA 7160?

Ruling:

(1) The court ruled in light of the historical background of the barangay elections, the intent and design of the legislature to limit the term of barangay officials to only three (3) years as provided under the Local Government Code emerges as bright as the sunlight.  The cardinal rule in the interpretation of all laws is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the law. And three years is the obvious intent.

(2) The court ruled to the question at issue on how long the term of barangay officials is, the answer of the Commission was simple, clear and quick: "As may be determined by law"; more precisely, "(a)s provided for in the Local Autonomy Code." And the Local Autonomy Code, in its Sec. 43-c, limits their term to three years.

(3) Yes. The sum total of these absurdities in petitioners’ theory is that  barangay officials are estopped from asking for any term other than that which they ran for and were elected to, under the law governing their very claim to such offices: namely, RA 7160, the Local Government Code.  Petitioners’ belated claim of ignorance as to what law governed their election to office in 1994 is unacceptable because under Art. 3 of the Civil Code, “(i)gnorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.”

It is obvious that these two petitions must fail.  The Constitution and the laws do not support them.  Extant jurisprudence militates against them.  Reason and common sense reject them. Equity and morality abhor them.  They are subtle but nonetheless self-serving propositions to lengthen governance without a mandate from the governed.  In a democracy, elected leaders can legally and morally justify their reign only by obtaining the voluntary consent of the electorate.  In this case however, petitioners propose to extend their terms not by seeking the people’s  vote but by faulty legal argumentation.  This Court cannot and will not grant its imprimatur to such untenable proposition.  If they want to continue serving, they must get a new mandate in the elections scheduled on May 12, 1997.
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G.R. No. 133495. September 3, 1998

BENJAMIN U. BORJA, JR., petitioner vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSE T. CAPCO, JR., respondents.

Facts:

Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992.  On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja.  On May 11, 1992, he ran and was elected mayor for a term of three years which ended on June 30, 1995.  On May 8, 1995, he was reelected mayor for another term of three years ending June 30, 1998. On March 27, 1998, private respondent Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998 elections.  Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco’s disqualification on the theory that the latter would have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would therefore be ineligible to serve for another term after that.

Issue:

Whether a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law and serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit.

Ruling:

No, because he was not elected to the office of the mayor in the first term but simply found himself thrust unto it by operation of law. neither had he served the full term because he only continued the service, interrupted by the death of the deceased mayor. 
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