Constitutional Law 2 - Bill of Rights

G.R. No. L-15972. October 11, 1920

Kwong Sing, in his own behalf and in behalf of all others having a common or general interest in the subject-matter of this action, plaintiff-appellant, vs. The City of Manila, defendant-appellant.

Facts:

Ordinance No. 532 of the city of Manila requiring receipts in duplicate in English and Spanish duly signed showing the kind and number of articles delivered by laundries and dyeing and cleaning establishments which was established and approved on February 25, 1919.

Issue:

Whether or not Ordinance No. 532 enacted by the government of the City of Manila is valid.

Ruling:

The Court held that Ordinance 532 is found not to be oppressive, or unequal, nor unjust, it is valid. The ordinance invades no fundamental right, and impairs no personal privilege. Under the guise of police regulation, an attempt is not made to violate personal property rights. The ordinance is neither discriminatory nor unreasonable in its operation. It applies to all public laundries without distinction, whether they belong to Americans, Filipinos, Chinese, or any other nationality. All, without exception, and each every one of them without distinction, must comply with the ordinance. There is no privilege, no discrimination, and no distinction. Equally and uniformly the ordinance applies to all engaged in the laundry business, and, as nearly as may be, the same burdens are cast upon them.

G.R. No. 131482.  July 3, 2002

Regalado P. Samartino, petitioner, vs. Leonor B. Raon, Agustin G. Crisostomo, The Municipal Trial Court of Noveleta, Cavite, Hon. Manuel A. Mayo, Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Cavite City, Hon. Rolando D. Diaz, Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Cavite City, Sheriff Danilo G. Lapuz, Cavite City and The Hon. Court of Appeals, respondents.

Facts:

Respondents Leonor Bernardo-Raon and Agustin G. Crisostomo are the surviving sister and spouse, respectively, of the late Filomena Bernardo-Crisostomo, who passed away on May 17, 1994. Among the properties left by the deceased was her one-half share in a parcel of land in Noveleta, Cavite, registered under the name of co-owners Lido Beach Corporation and Filomena Bernardo. On January 25, 1996, respondents instituted against petitioner Regalado P. Samartino a complaint for ejectment alleging that during the lifetime of Filomena Bernardo, she leased her share in the property to petitioner for a period of five years counted from 1986; that the said lease expired and was not extended thereafter; and that petitioner refused to vacate the property despite demands therefor. Summons was served on Roberto Samartino, brother of petitioner. At the time of service of summons at petitioner’s house, he was not at home as he was then confined at the National Bureau of Investigation Treatment and Rehabilitation Center (NBI-TRC), Tagaytay City since January 19, 1996, where he was undergoing treatment and rehabilitation for drug dependency. Thus, on February 2, 1996, a liaison officer of the NBI-TRC appeared before the trial court with a certification that petitioner will be unable to comply with the directive to answer the complaint within the reglementary period, inasmuch as it will take six months for him to complete the rehabilitation program and before he can be recommended for discharge by the Rehabilitation Committee.

Issue:

Whether or not the right of petitioner to due process is violated.

Ruling:

Yes. The trial court’s failure to give petitioner a reasonable opportunity to file his answer violated his right to due process. There being no valid substituted service of summons, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. It should be emphasized that the service of summons is not only required to give the court jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, but also to afford the latter an opportunity to be heard on the claim made against him. Thus, compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is as much an issue of due process as of jurisdiction. The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of his defense. It is elementary that before a person can be deprived of his property, he should first be informed of the claim against him and the theory on which such claim is premised.

G.R. No. 157219.  May 28, 2004

Natividad E. Bautista, Clemente E. Bautista and Socorro L. Angeles, petitioners, vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, Manila Papermills, International, Inc., Adelfa Properties, Inc. and Spouses Rodolfo Javellana And Nelly Javellana, respondents.

Facts:

On August 12, 1999, petitioners Natividad E. Bautista, Clemente E. Bautista and Socorro L. Angeles filed a complaint against respondent Manila Papermills, International, Inc. for quieting of title. This complaint was later amended to implead respondents Adelfa Properties, Inc. and the spouses Rodolfo and Nelly Javellana. fter several delays spanning more than two years, the case was finally set for trial.  However, on May 2, 2002, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Postponement to cancel the hearing on the ground that Atty. Michael Macaraeg, the lawyer assigned to the case was in the United States attending to an important matter. The trial court denied petitioners motion for postponement and considered them as having waived the presentation of their evidence.

Issue:

Whether or not there is a violation to due process.

Ruling:

No, due process is not violated. Petitioners’ contention that they were denied due process is not well- taken.  Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due process. Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an opportunity to be heard.  If it is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violating the constitutional guarantee.

G.R. No. 158793. June 8, 2006

James Mirasol, Richard Santiago, and Luzon Motorcyclists Federation, Inc., petitioners, vs. Department of Public Works and Highways and Toll Regulatory Board, respondents.

Facts:

On January 10, 2001, petitioners filed before the trial court a Petition for Declaratory Judgment with Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction to nullity of the following administrative issuances for being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Act 2000, entitled "Limited Access Highway Act" enacted in 1957: (a) DPWH Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1968; (b) DPWH Department Order No. 74, Series of 1993; and (c) Art. II, Sec. 3 (a) of the Revised Rules on Limited Access Facilities promulgated in 199[8] by the DPWH thru the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB). 

Issue:

Whether or not Administrative Order No. 1 introduces an unreasonable classification by singling-out motorcycles from other motorized modes of transport and violates the right to travel.

Ruling:

No. Petitioners are not being deprived of their right to use the limited access facility. They are merely being required, just like the rest of the public, to adhere to the rules on how to use the facility. AO 1 does not infringe upon petitioners’ right to travel but merely bars motorcycles, bicycles, tricycles, pedicabs, and any non-motorized vehicles as the mode of traveling along limited access highways. There exists real and substantial differences exist between a motorcycle and other forms of transport sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the toll ways. A classification based on practical convenience and common knowledge is not unconstitutional simply because it may lack purely theoretical or scientific uniformity.

G.R. No. L-45987. May 5, 1939

The People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Cayat, defendant-appellant.

Facts:

On or about January 25, 1937, in the City of Baguio, the above-named accused, Cayat, being a member of the non-Christian tribes, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and illegally receive, acquire, and have in his possession and under his control or custody, one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of Act No. 1639.

Issue:

Whether or not Act No. 1639 is unconstitutional for being discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws, violates the due process and improper exercise of the police power of the State.

Ruling:

Act No. 1639 is valid and unconstitutional. The Act applies equally to all members of the class is evident from a perusal thereof. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number non-Christians by reason of their degree of culture is not an argument against the equality of its application. The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as "an inferior or less capable race." When the public safety or the public morals require the discontinuance of a certain practice by certain class of persons, the hand of the Legislature cannot be stayed from providing for its discontinuance by any incidental inconvenience which some members of the class may suffer. The private interests of such members must yield to the paramount interests of the nation.

A.M. No. MTJ-10-1770. July 18, 2012
(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 10-2255-MTJ)

Office of Administrative Services-Office of the Court Administrator, complainant, vs. Judge Ignacio B. Macarine, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Gen. Luna, Surigao Del Norte, respondent.

Facts:

On August 13, 2009, the respondent wrote then Court Administrator, now Associate Justice Jose Portugal Perez, requesting for authority to travel to Hongkong with his family for the period of September 10 - 14, 2009 where he would celebrate his 65th birthday. The respondent stated that his travel abroad shall be charged to his annual forced leave. However, he did not submit the corresponding application for leave. For his failure to submit the complete requirements, his request for authority to travel remained unacted upon. The respondent proceeded with his travel abroad without the required travel authority from the OCA. On January 28, 2010, the respondent was informed by the OCA that his leave of absence for the period of September 9-15, 2009 had been disapproved and his travel considered unauthorized by the Court. His absences shall not be deducted from his leave credits but from his salary corresponding to the seven days that he was absent, pursuant to Section 50 of the Omnibus Rules on Leave. The respondent was also required to submit his explanation on his failure to comply with OCA Circular No. 49-2003.

Issue:

Whether or not there exists a violation to the right to travel.

Ruling: 

There is no violation on the right to travel. True, the right to travel is guaranteed by the Constitution. However, the exercise of such right is not absolute. Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution allows restrictions on one’s right to travel provided that such restriction is in the interest of national security, public safety or public health as may be provided by law. This, however, should by no means be construed as limiting the Court’s inherent power of administrative supervision over lower courts. OCA Circular No. 49-2003 does not restrict but merely regulates, by providing guidelines to be complied by judges and court personnel, before they can go on leave to travel abroad. To "restrict" is to restrain or prohibit a person from doing something; to "regulate" is to govern or direct according to rule.

G.R. No. 186592. October 10, 2012

Governor Enrique T. Garcia, Jr., Aurelio C. Angeles, Jr., Emerlinda S Talento, and Rodolfo H. De Mesa, petitioners, vs. Leo Ruben C. Manrique, respondent.

Facts:

The instant case stemmed from an article in Luzon Tribune, wherein respondent Manrique is the publisher/editor, which allegedly contained disparaging statements against the Supreme Court. The petitioners alleged that the subject article undermines the people’s faith in the Supreme Court due to the blunt allusion that they employed bribery in order to obtain relief from the court, particularly in obtaining a TRO in a certain case. Manrique alleged that there was nothing malicious or defamatory in his article since he only started the facts or circumstances which attended the issuance of the TRO.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not court decisions are beyond criticism and public opinion; and (2) whether Manrique’s invocation of freedom of speech in his criticism tenable.

Ruling:

(1) No. The Court held that every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers and such right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at judicial authority. It is, however, crucial that such criticism be decent and proper.

(2) No, Manrique’s article no longer partakes of an adverse criticism of an official act but an independent attempt to malign the petitioners which ultimately brought equal harm to the reputation of the Court. Malicious publication cannot seek the protection of the constitutional guarantees of free speech and press.

G. R. No. 197788. February 29, 2012

Rodel Luz y Ong, petitioner, vs. People of the Philippines, respondent.

Facts:

On March 10, 2003 at around 3:00 o’clock in the morning, PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned as a traffic enforcer saw the accused, who was coming from the direction of Panganiban Drive and going to Diversion Road, Naga City, driving a motorcycle without a helmet; that this prompted him to flag down the accused for violating a municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet while driving said motor vehicle, invited the accused to come inside their sub-station since the place is almost in front of the said sub-station. He was alerted of the accused’s uneasy movement and thus asked to take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it; that the accused obliged and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-like tin or metal container about two (2) to three (3) inches in size, including two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife; that upon seeing the said container, he asked the accused to open it; that after the accused opened the container, he noticed a cartoon cover and something beneath it; and that upon his instruction, the accused spilled out the contents of the container on the table which turned out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were empty while the other two (2) contained suspected shabu.

Issue:

Whether or not the roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop can be considered a formal arrest.

Ruling:

There was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested. Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that person’s voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary. There being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was likewise illegal. The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in “plain view;” (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) a “stop and frisk” search; and (vii) exigent and emergency circumstances. None of the above-mentioned instances, especially a search incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable to this case.

G. R. No. 191532. August 15, 2012

Margarita Ambre y Cayuni, petitioner, vs. People of the Philippines, respondent.

Facts:

On or about April 20, 2005, the Caloocan Police Station Anti-Illegal Drug-Special Operation Unit conducted a buy-bust operation pursuant to a tip from a police informant that a certain Abdullah Sultan and his wife Ina Aderp was engaged in the selling of dangerous drugs at a residential compound in Caloocan City; that buy-bust operation resulted in the arrest of Aderp and a certain Moctar Tagoranao; that Sultan run away from the scene of the entrapment operation and PO3 Moran, PO2 Masi and PO1 Mateo, pursued him; that in the course of the chase, Sultan led the said police officers to his house; that inside the house, he police operatives found Ambre, Castro and Mendoza having a pot session; that Ambre in particular, was caught sniffing what was suspected to be a shabu in a rolled up alumni foil;  and that PO3 Moran ran after Sultan while PO2 Masi and PO1 Mateo arrested Ambre, Castro and Mendoza for illegal use of shabu.

Issue:

Whether or not the arrest of and search done against petitioner is valid.

Ruling:

Yes, the Court held that the arrest of and search done against the petitioner is valid. In arrest in flagrante delicto, the accused is apprehended at the very moment he is committing or attempting to commit or has just committed an offense in the presence of the arresting officer. Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

G.R. Nos. 177857-58. January 24, 2012

Philippine Coconut, Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED), Manuel V. Del Rosario, Domingo P. Espina, Salvador P. Ballares, Joselito A. Moraleda, Paz M. Yason, Vicente A. Cadiz, Cesaria De Luna Titular, and Raymundo C. De Villa, Petitioners, vs. Republic of the Philippines, respondent.

Facts:

In 1971, R.A. 6260 was enacted creating the Coconut Investment Company to administer the Coconut Investment Fund. The declaration of martial law in September 1972 saw the issuance of several presidential decrees purportedly designed to improve the coconut industry through the collection and use of the coconut levy fund. In G.R. Nos. 177857-58, class action petitioners COCOFED and a group of purported coconut farmers and COCOFED members, hereinafter “COCOFED et al.” collectively seek the reversal of the judgments and resolutions of the anti-graft court insofar as these issuances are adverse to their interests. As a procedural issue, COCOFED, et al. and Ursua contends that in the course of almost 20 years that the cases have been with the anti-graft court, they have repeatedly sought leave to adduce evidence (prior to respondent’s complete presentation of evidence) to prove the coco farmers’  actual and beneficial ownership of the sequestered shares.  The Sandiganbayan, however, had repeatedly and continuously disallowed such requests, thus depriving them of their constitutional right to be heard.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not petitioners COCOFED et al. were not deprived of their right to be heard; and (2) whether or not the right to speedy trial was violated.

Ruling:

(1)  No, petitioner COCOFED’s right to be heard had not been violated by the mere issuance of PSJ-A and PSJ-F before they can adduce their evidence. As it were, petitioners COCOFED et al. were able to present documentary evidence in conjunction with its “Class Action Omnibus Motion” dated February 23, 2001 where they appended around four hundred (400) documents including affidavits of alleged farmers. These petitioners manifested that said documents comprise their evidence to prove the farmers’ ownership of the UCPB shares, which were distributed in accordance with valid and existing laws. Lastly, COCOFED et al. even filed their own Motion for Separate Summary Judgment, an event reflective of their admission that there are no more factual issues left to be determined at the level of the Sandiganbayan.  This act of filing a motion for summary judgment is a judicial admission against COCOFED under Section 26, Rule 130 which declares that the “act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.”

(2) No. As a matter of settled jurisprudence, but subject to equally settled exception, an issue not raised before the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.  The sporting idea forbidding one from pulling surprises underpins this rule. For these reasons, the instant case cannot be dismissed for the alleged violation of petitioners’ right to a speedy disposition of the case. It must be clarified right off that the right to a speedy disposition of case and the accused’s right to a speedy trial are distinct, albeit kindred, guarantees, the most obvious difference being that a speedy disposition of cases, as provided in Article III, Section 16 of the Constitution.  In fine, the right to a speedy trial is available only to an accused and is a peculiarly criminal law concept, while the broader right to a speedy disposition of cases may be tapped in any proceedings conducted by state agencies.