Case Digest: G.R. No. L-16217. October 9, 1920. 41 Phil 94

The United States, plaintiff-appellee, vs. M. J. Limsiongco, Vicente Yap, Yap Bun, Tan Fong, Sing Joy, Chino Saya (alias) Isaias Javier, Lim Liongco, Sing Yang, Lorenzo Pavia And Mariano Tan-Congco, defendants-appellants.

Facts: The second division of the Supreme Court rendered a decision in a case on gambling.  Within the time allowed by the Rules of the Court, counsel for appellants have raised a question unconnected with the merits of the particular case, but assailing the very structure of the court itself. Appellant's motion is based on the ground that the instant decision was rendered by a division of the court and not by the body constituted by law for the purpose, and hence the decisions as rendered, was rendered by a body outside the law and having no power, authority or jurisdiction to render a final decision in the controversy.

Issue: Whether or not section 138 of the Administrative Code which authorizes divisions in the Supreme Court had diminished the authority of the Supreme Court to hear and determine causes.

Ruling: No. The Supreme Court remains a unit notwithstanding it works in divisions. Although it may have two divisions, it is but a single court. Actions considered in any one of these divisions and decisions rendered therein are, in effect, by the same Tribunal. The two divisions of this court are not to be considered as two separate and distinct courts but as divisions of one and the same court. In the exact words of the law which is questioned, the Supreme Court shall, as a body, sit in banc, but it may sit in divisions. In addition, the Supreme Court held that the Philippine Legislature had power to enact law authorizing the Supreme Court to sit either in banc or in divisions to transact business.

 

Case Digest: G.R. No. 131136. February 28, 2001

Conrado L. De Rama, petitioner, vs. The Court Of Appeals (Ninth Division, The Civil Service Commission), Eladio Martinez, Divino De Jesus, Morell Ayala, Aristeo Catalla, Daisy Porta, Flordeliza Oriasel, Graciela Glory, Felecidad Orinday, Ma. Petra Muffet Luce, Elsa Marino, Bernardita Mendoza, Jane Macatangay, Adelfo Glodoviza and Florino Ramos, respondents.

Facts: Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, petitioner Conrado L. de Rama wrote a letter dated July 13, 1995 to the Civil Service Commission (or CSC), seeking the recall of the appointments of fourteen (14) municipal employees. Justifying his recall request on the allegation that the appointments of the said employees were “midnight” appointments of the former mayor, Ma. Evelyn S. Abeja, done in violation of Article VII, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution. The CSC denied petitioner’s request for the recall of the appointments of the fourteen employees, for lack of merit. The CSC upheld the validity of the appointments on the ground that they had already been approved by the Head of the CSC Field Office in Lucena City, and for petitioner’s failure to present evidence that would warrant the revocation or recall of the said appointments.

Issue:  whether or not the recall made by petitioner is valid.

Ruling: No. It is the CSC that is authorized to recall an appointment initially approved, but only when such appointment and approval are proven to be in disregard of applicable provisions of the civil service law and regulations. Rule V, Section 9 of the Omnibus Implementing Regulations of the Revised Administrative Code specifically provides that “an appointment accepted by the appointee cannot be withdrawn or revoked by the appointing authority and shall remain in force and in effect until disapproved by the Commission.

Accordingly, the appointments of the private respondents may only be recalled on the following grounds: (a) Non-compliance with the procedures/criteria provided in the agency’s Merit Promotion Plan; (b) Failure to pass through the agency’s Selection/Promotion Board; (c) Violation of the existing collective agreement between management and employees relative to promotion; or (d) Violation of other existing civil service law, rules and regulations.

Case Digest: G.R. No. 152259. July 29, 2004

Alfredo T. Romualdez, petitioner, vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) and the People of the Philippines, respondents.

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Facts: People of the Philippines, through PCGG, filed a petition charging the accused with violation of Section 5, RA. 3019 as amended. Said petitioner, brother-in-law of former President Marcos and therefore, related by affinity within the third civil degree, did then and there willfully and unlawfully, and with evident bad faith, for the purpose of promoting his self-interested sic and/or that of others, intervene directly or indirectly, in a contract between the National Shipyard and Steel Corporation (NASSCO), a government-owned and controlled corporation and the Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Company (BASECO), a private corporation, the majority stocks of which is owned by former President Marcos, whereby the NASSCO sold, transferred and conveyed to the BASECO its ownership and all its titles and interests over all equipment and facilities including structures, buildings, shops, quarters, houses, plants and expendable and semi-expendable assets, located at the Engineer Island known as the Engineer Island Shops including some of its equipment and machineries from Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte needed by BASECO in its shipbuilding and ship repair program for the amount of P5,000,000.00.

Issue: whether or not petitioner enjoys derivative immunity from suit.

Ruling: In Estrada vs. Desierto, the SC exhaustively traced the origin of executive immunity in order to determine the extent of its applicability. Executive immunity applied only during the incumbency of a President.  It could not be used to shield a non-sitting President from prosecution for alleged criminal acts done while sitting in office.  The reasoning of petitioner must therefore fail, since he derives his immunity from one who is no longer sitting as President.  Verily, the felonious acts of public officials and their close relatives are not acts of the State, and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands on the same footing as any other trespasser.

Case Digest: G.R. No. 92013 July 25, 1990

Salvador H. Laurel, petitioner, vs. Ramon Garcia, as head of the Asset Privatization Trust, Raul Manglapus, as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and Catalino Macaraig, as Executive Secretary, respondents.

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Facts: The subject property in this case is one of the 4 properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan, the Roppongi property. The said property was acquired from the Japanese government through Reparations Contract No. 300. It consists of the land and building for the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy. As intended, it became the site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferred to Nampeidai when the Roppongi building needed major repairs. President Aquino created a committee to study the disposition/utilization of Philippine government properties in Tokyo and Kobe, Japan. The President issued EO 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of separations' capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease or disposition.

Issues: Whether or not the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority and jurisdiction, to sell the Roppongi property.

Ruling: It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government on his or her own sole will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence. It is indeed true that the Roppongi property is valuable not so much because of the inflated prices fetched by real property in Tokyo but more so because of its symbolic value to all Filipinos, veterans and civilians alike. Whether or not the Roppongi and related properties will eventually be sold is a policy determination where both the President and Congress must concur. Considering the properties' importance and value, the laws on conversion and disposition of property of public dominion must be faithfully followed.