Case Digest: G.R. No. L-20864. August 23, 1963

Elpidio Valencia, petitioner, vs. Macario Peralta, Jr., respondent.

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Facts: Valencia was designated Acting Chairman of the board of directors of the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority by the then Pres. Garcia. Allegedly upon information that the then Pres. Garcia had extended him as an ad interim appointment, petitioner took an oath of office to the position of Chairman Ad Interim of said Authority of which the Commission on Appointments confirmed and specified the expiration date of his term of office. However, Pres. Macapagal appointed respondent as ad interim to the same position. Thereafter, the petitioner ceased to attend any board meeting and eventually instituted the present petition.

Issue: Whether or not the appointment of Valencia is valid.

Ruling: No. The designation of petitioner as Acting Chairman of the NAWASA Board of Directors is of revocable and temporary character which could not ripen into a permanent appointment, even if it was subsequently confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, because confirmation presupposes a valid nomination or recess appointment, of which there is no trace. Neither does the fact that petitioner Valencia subscribed an oath of office as ad interim appointee to the position help his case, since the oath clearly does not correspond to the temporary designation as Acting Chairman that was accorded him. There is on record only one written designation of petitioner, a mere Acting Chairman, that was not a permanent appointment, was revocable at any time by the Chief Executive, and actually revoked by the subsequent designation of respondent Peralta.

Case Digest: P.E.T. CASE No. 002. March 29, 2005

Ronald Allan Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr., protestant, vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, protestee.

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Facts: GMA was proclaimed by the congress as duly elected President of the Philippines. Refusing to concede defeat, the second-placer in the elections, FPJ, filed an election protest before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal.  However, the protestant died in the course of his medical treatment at St. Luke’s Hospital. Now, the widow of FPJ, Mrs. Jesusa Sonora Poe submitted a manifestation with urgent petition/motion to intervene as a substitute for deceased protestant FPJ.

Issue: Whether the widow may substitute/intervene for the protestant who died during the pendency of the latter’s protest case.

Ruling: No. The court held in Vda. de De Mesa that while the right to a public office is personal and exclusive to the public officer, an election protest is not purely personal and exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee such that the death of either would oust the court of all authority to continue the protest proceedings. Hence, substitution and intervention is allowed but only by a real party in interest. A real party in interest is the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, and the party who is entitled to the avails of the suit.  Herein movant/intervenor, Mrs. FPJ, herself denies any claim to the august office of President.  Thus, given the circumstances of this case, we can conclude that protestant’s widow is not a real party in interest to this election protest.

Case Digest: G.R. No. 78239 February 9, 1989

Salvacion A. Monsanto, petitioner, vs. Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., respondent.
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Facts: The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner and three other accused, of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public document. Petitioner appealed her conviction to the Supreme Court which subsequently affirmed the same. She then filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was by then President Marcos absolute pardon. By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the same was still vacant. Petitioner's letter-request was referred to the Ministry of Finance for resolution in view of the provision of the Local Government Code transferring the power of appointment of treasurers from the city governments to the said Ministry. The Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to her position without the necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the date she was extended the absolute pardon. Seeking reconsideration of the foregoing ruling, petitioner wrote the Ministry stressing that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which implies that her service in the government has never been interrupted and therefore the date of her reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive suspension; that she is entitled to back pay for the entire period of her suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the proportionate share of the amount of P4, 892.50. The Ministry of Finance, however, referred petitioner's letter to the Office of the President for further review and action. Through Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgenio S. Factoran, Jr. held that acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a former public officer is the only ground for reinstatement to his former position and entitlement to payment of his salaries, benefits and emoluments due to him during the period of his suspension pendente lite and that petitioner is not entitled to an automatic reinstatement on the basis of the absolute pardon granted her but must secure an appointment to her former position and that, notwithstanding said absolute pardon, she is liable for the civil liability concomitant to her previous conviction.

Issue: Whether or not a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment.

Ruling: There is a need to apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment. The absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of public documents. It is clear from the authorities referred to that when her guilt and punishment were expunged by her pardon; this particular disability was likewise removed. Henceforth, petitioner may apply for reappointment to the office which was forfeited by reason of her conviction. And in considering her qualifications and suitability for the public post, the facts constituting her offense must be and should be evaluated and taken into account to determine ultimately whether she can once again be entrusted with public funds. Stated differently, the pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.